The Rapid Deployment Force (Peter Antill)
What is a rapid deployment force? How does it differ from other forces in structure, mission and use? A rapid deployment force is usually configured as an elite body of troops that are designed to move greater distances and in shorter times than their counterparts in the rest of the armed forces. Of course regular military formations are designed to be reasonably mobile and capable of distant deployment if necessary. For example, the Reforger reinforcements from the Continental United States, which were designed to reinforce NATO's Central Front in time of crisis, were expected to be withdrawing their equipment from the POMCUS (Prepositioned Overseas Material Configured in Unit Sets) stores in around ten days. These reinforcements consisted of two divisional and ten non-divisional units of the US Army, as well as additional tactical fighter wings from the US Air Force. While this seems impressive (and it is) it should be remembered that the majority of these units would only have to be flown in by air into a Central European infrastructure (airports, military airfields, tarmac covered autobahns, major and minor roads) and assuming that they were mobilised ahead of hostilities (a good chance) would not be facing enemy action as soon as they arrived (or even as they were en route).
A rapid deployment force must be prepared to have only a few, or possibly none of these luxuries. It must be able not only to move great distances in as short a time as possible, but take much of what it needs with it. Prepositioning, of course, can help to a certain extent but because rapid deployment forces are supposed to be mobile and cover a wide geographical area, this would unnecessarily tie it into one specific area, although maritime prepositioning is not as bad as the ships can be sent to the particular troublespot in question. The RDF may also have to arrange for the equipment to be unloaded (a problem if there is a lack of available landing strips or cargo handling facilities at the ports) and "marry up" the equipment with the appropriate personnel if they have arrived separately (as they did during Operation Desert Shield) and deploy, possibly under hostile fire. This is where the rapid deployment force differs from its counterparts - its flexibility, mobility and speed.
But the very nature of rapid deployment forces also brings a number of questions and issues into focus. The very specialised nature of the forces means that they also tend to cost more than their counterparts, not only in terms of the force itself (personnel, equipment, training in exotic locations and Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I)) but of the assets required for it to do its job. These include strategic lift (airborne and maritime) and the logistical requirements they have, making sure the bases used on the way have the necessary equipment and supplies, the upkeep of equipment and supplies held in storage at prepositioned sites and the inevitable opportunity cost that this involves (for example, more prepositioning and fast break-bulk carriers means less money for the US Navy to spend on their submarines and carrier battle groups). There is also the question of effectiveness. In order to travel any sort of distance in a short time the force (or the initial elements of it anyway) will have to be based around light infantry, such as airborne or air mobile troops. As such these troops will only be able to carry a small amount of equipment and supplies until reinforced either by airlift or in the longer term, sealift. As very few transport aircraft can carry oversized loads (the Russian An-124 and American C-5 are examples) this will limit the number of vehicles the initial force can take with it and thus while it may have great strategic mobility initially, it will be limited in the amount of tactical mobility it has, once it deploys.
It is worth noting two relationships that all planners of rapid deployment forces have to take into account, that of strategic mobility verses tactical mobility (the more a force has of one, the less it tends to have of the other) and the related one of airlift verses sealift (airlift can get to different areas of the world quickly but is limited in the amount of material it can carry, while sealift can carry vastly more in terms of material but takes a lot longer to get anywhere). so any initial force, while getting to the troublespot quickly will be limited in the amount of tactical mobility it has and may be in trouble if faced with a more tactically mobile opponent, especially if they are highly mechanised or even motorised.
Rapid deployment forces also raise political issues, due to their funding and may be perceived as an implicit threat by those countries or actors with whom the state owning the force has relations with. It could also be used as a method of deterrence or political gesture if the force regularly exercises in allied territory. C3I is also a consideration which impacts on cost but also standardisation. The very mission of the rapid deployment force means that it may require more sophisticated or specialised C3I assets which may have to be developed differently from the rest of the armed forces. There is also the question of usage, do they have to react to every crisis, and if not, which ones do they react to? Are they a liability, meaning that once you have them, do people start looking to you in times of need? Does this saddle you with additional responsibility, that perhaps you were not ready for?
With the end of the Cold War and the resultant budgetary pressures on the military establishments, particularly of the Western states, and the lowering of military readiness which this entails, there will still be a need in the post-Cold War international environment for small, well trained and equipped forces to act as intervention forces, either in the national interest or at the behest of an international organisation, such as the UN. As such it is interesting to note that the United States, Russia, France, United Kingdom and Germany will be keeping their rapid deployment forces and even upgrading them. Several smaller states have expressed a desire to have such forces, or have actively started to set them up, for example, South Africa, Brazil and Malaysia, and even the North Atlantic Alliance has set up its own large scale rapid deployment force, known as the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and is organised on a multinational footing in a similar manner to the ACE (Allied Command Europe) Mobile Force, which is a brigade sized formation which is designed to be sent in a short period of time to any troublespot in Alliance territory, as a show of determination and Alliance solidarity.
In a similar vein, there have been suggestions regarding the setting up an African rapid deployment force, possibly based around the South African unit, although by no means limited to South Africa alone, and preferably having contingents from several OAU (Organisation of African Unity) members, to act under UN and / or OAU auspices. Such a unit would be a brigade sized unit, realistically, and be made up of light infantry with light and reliable equipment, be self-contained in terms of logistical and combat support assets, have C3I assets that can interface with various national ones if required, and is capable of being deployed by parachute or air-landed, by helicopter or amphibious vessel. [note 1] There has even been talk of setting up a UN rapid reaction force in order to speed up the deployment of peacekeeping operations and prevent needless lives being lost due to slow reaction times, a factor that was highlighted in the Rwandan crisis. Such ideas that have been reported [note 2] include the setting up of a 5000 man brigade sized unit, whose component formations would be on call in their respective countries, and a permanent military planning staff at the UN of around thirty to fifty personnel to organise standard operating procedures and contingency plans. Such a force should have the capability, it is argued, to put the headquarters in place within a week, and have the brigade deployed in about three to five weeks.
The history of the rapid deployment force is rich and varied, as with all military formations. The various component formations that are traditionally associated with rapid deployment and power projection each have a varied history by themselves. By these formations I mean marines, airborne and air mobile troops, light infantry and special forces. Marines are the oldest of the formations and modern marines can trace their history back to the naval landing parties of Peter the Great (at the turn of the Eighteenth century) and the US Marine Corps which was originally set up by the Continental Congress in 1775 (and as an historical aside, are the only part of the US Armed Forces that has their strength mandated by Congress not to fall below a certain level). [note 3] The concept of light infantry and special forces goes back a long way, but the modern equivalents trace their history back to the beginning of the Eighteenth Century with the French adoption of light cavalry (hussars), through to the American War of Independence and the Wars of Revolution / Napoleonic Wars with the light infantry formations that were used as scouts and sharpshooters in front and to the flanks of the main forces and were known as Grenz, Chasseurs and Jagers depending on the country of origin. These troops were usually huntsmen, trappers or woodsmen, possessed initiative, independence and could live off the land, and were thus not as dependant on command and control as the traditional heavy formations. Airborne and air mobile troops are the youngest of the formations. These were first tested by the Soviet Union in a parachute drop on the 2nd August 1930, near Voronesh, [note 4] and subsequently refined by the Germans and western Allies, particularly the Americans who went on to develop the concepts of Air Mobility and Air Assault with the extensive use of the helicopter in Vietnam, and which was again refined by the Soviets in Afghanistan.
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How to cite this article: Antill, P. The Rapid Deployment Force, http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/concepts_rdf.html